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Inauthenticity, Anxiety, Waiting: or, The Unnamable Design
~lichael R. ;!unnicutt
Brigham Young University
for A.C. Seitz

Open any of Beckett's texts, and the first thing you realize is his erudite,
failing clowns have been thrown into an existence they neither asked for nor
understand: Murphy tied naked to a wooden rocker, Watt cast off the evening
tram looking more 1 ike a roll of carpet than a man, Molloy lying in Mother's
bed wondering how he got there, or perhaps best known, Vladimir and Estragon,
wa iti n9 for Godot. In Hei deggerian terms, Beckett's characters are thrown into
the inauthentic existence of the they-self. As such, they wait for a disclosing
of authenticity, but when anxiety produces the opening, Beckett's characters
lack the courage to enter into authenticity. Failing to becorre authentic,
they wait in stasis, always on the brink of choosing individual action, yet
always incapable of doing so. Valdimir, for example, admits both the futility
and the comfort of inauthenti c exi stence when he ponders whether or not he
should assist Pozzo: "Let us not waste our time in idle discourse," he rants
in hauntingly Heideggerian language, "Let us do something, while we have the
chance: It is not every day that we are needed" (WFG 51). But just before
committing himself to action, he falls back on his plea: "Not that we personally are needed. Others would meet the case equally well, if not better. To
all llIankind they were addressed, those cries for help still ringing in our
ears~
But at this place, at this moment of tirre, all mankind is us, whether
we like it or not" (WFG 51). Here the others Vladimir turns his back on
are the 'they' of inauthentic existence.
To become authentic, Beckett's characters, like Heidegger's Dasein, must
learn to enact their own individual voice against the collective voice of the
'they.' In ~J_ng and Time Heidegger states:
If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of
failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself,
then it must first be able to find itself--to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in
that itl~ste!1_s__away to the 'they.' (315-16)
Learning to listen away from the collective voice "has the character of
ap2~_al to Dasein by calling it to its ownroost potentiality-for-Being-itsself" (BT 314). But Being-in-its-self offers Beckett's characters a
freedom they haven't the courage to accept. They're too busy analyzing
the various possibilities to ever choose one of them. And like Vladimir,
they fear choosing one action will forever deny the choice of other actions.
Thus the Beckett clown-tramp waits, a la Hamm, always on the verge of enacting
the "last million last moments" C~n-.9~~ 83). "I can't go on, I'll go
on," concludes the Unnamable, taking Charlie Brown wishy-washiness to its
extreme, and after 120 pages of trying to decide what to do, he sinks back
into the inauthentic existence of waiting.
So What's to be done? Why can't Beckett's characters rise from the they-self
to the I-self? One answer is found by realizing that, on one level of misreading, Beckett and Heidegger are exploring parallel parables of Being.
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Both Beckett's characters and Heidegger's Dasein are fundamentally Beingsin-the-wor1d. As such, they are subject to anxiety, a basic state-of-mind
capable of opening possibilities of authentic action. But Beckett's characters
fail to grasp onto this offered freedom, thus they remain waiting in a
death-in-1ife, inauthentic existence.
As mentioned, both Beckett's characters and Dasein exist fundamentally as
Beings-thrown-into-the-wor1d. In Bein.9~nd_Tirre Heidegger clearly argues
that Being-in is "the formal existential ex ression for the Bein of Dasein,
w~_1_~~_ h.a.?_~e i ng- i n:the:"worLd -as i ts-es-sen t~ ta te
80.
y e 1 n1 t 1 on,
Dasein eX-lsts, stands-out-from, other Beings and entities in the world.
Note how the opening lines of any number of Beckett's texts confirm awareness
of location and Being-in-the-wor1d. ~~: "I am in my mother's room.
It is I who live there now" (TN 1). Mo1one Dies: "I shall soon be quite
rlead at last in spite of it ale PerhaPS-next month" (TN 179). The Unnamab1e:
"Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning. I, say-I" (TN 291).
[nsl..9al~ likewise begins with C10v situating the there-ness of fils Being:
"I
can't be punished any more. I'll go now to my kitchen, ten feet, by ten feet,
by ten feet, and wait for him to whistle rre" (1..J2). This accute awareness of
presence continues into Beckett's latest dramatic pieces such as "What Where."
Here five grey cloaked characters chant variations of
We are the last five.
rn th e pres e nt a s we re we still.
It is spring.
Time passes.
Fi rst without words.
I switch on. (Collected Shorter Pl~ 310)
This is not merely an exhibition of ego. - Like Dasein, Beckett's characters
exist in a non-Cartesian world, and lacking the subject-object schizophrenia,
both desire knowledge of how they relate alongside other Beings and objects
in the world. According to Heidegger,
When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does
not somehow fi rs t get out 0 f an i nne r sphe re in wh i ch it has been
proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it
is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which
belong to a world already discovered. (BT 89)
And he goes on to argue that "even in this 'Belng-outside' alongside the
object, Dasein is still 'inside'" (B) 89).
The setting of End~arre is a dramatic rendering of Dasein existing outsidealongside, yet inslde, the world. Even a dense reader would, with a little
thought, recognize the stage setting as the interior of a skull--presumab1y
Hamm's:
Bare interior.
Grey light.
Left and right back, high up, two sman windows, curtains drawn.
Front right, a door. (1)
Within this space sits "Front left, touching each other, covered with an old
sheet, two ashbins" (1). These ashbins house Hamm's parents, Nagg and Nell,
who exist and pass out of existence alongside each other. Prior to his
opening speech, C10v stiffly staggers from window to window--eye to eye. He
too exists alongside, yet inside, the world of Hamm's perception. C10ve;s a
~~~oJLLto, a project of Hamm's imagining, but simultaneously a res extensio,
a Being-with-location. In Clov, the Cartesian split dissolves, for C10v exists
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as does Dasein. His location is painfully represented by his inability to
sit down and becorre, as HallVll prophesies, "a speck in the void, in the dark,
for ever, like me . . . . a little bit of grit in the middle of the steppe"
(36) .
The thinqs within and without the setting of E~~~~ function as equipment
in the fleideggerian sense of the term. Heidegger translates "things" from
the Greek term meaning "that which one has to do with in one's concernful
dealings" (fLT 96). Such equiprrent is encountered through "assignrrent or
refe~.!1ce of sorrething to something"
(BT 97). Further, "equipment--in
accordance with its equiprrentality--always is in terms of its belonging to
other equi prrent" (BT 97). For Heidegger, equipment exists in two forms:
the present-at-hand-and the ready-to-hand. Because Dasein encounters the
world through concemful dealings with--care, ready-to-hand is its primary
way of encountering equipment. When Dasein encounters equipment, the world
discloses meaning, and for Heidegger, this announcement, opening, unconcealment, is truth.
Beckett's characters sadly,have some, difficulty distinguishing between
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. Thus they rarely open into
a true-ing space wherein authenticity can be enacted. Because Clov is
never able to grasp onto external equipment, the world around him is unable
to open into meaning, and he remains stuck between authenticity and inauthenticity. When Clov first peers through the telescope at the equipment
alongside him, he feels "a multitude . . . in transports . . . of joy" (29).
But "after reflection," that is, after analysis that robs readiness from
presence, "(He gets up on the 1adder, turns the tel escope on the without)
Let's see. (He looks, moving the telescope.) Zero . . . (he looks) . . .
Zero . . . (he looks) . . . and Zero" (29). Here he does what one does-looks and sees, but not what the individual does--looks and grasps. Then,
still looking and still ~nalyzing, Clov sees only present-at-hand entities,
equipment incapable of having a world: "All gone"--gulls, waves, sun (30-31).
Because the present-at-hand does not disclose individual meanings, the
inauthentic world Clov observes fails to mean: "Mean something! You and I,
mean something~ (He briefly laughs.) Ah, that's a good one~" (33).
Rega rdi ng Be i ng- i n - the -wo rl d, He ide gge r notes that" the ready- to-han dis
always understood in terms of a totality of involvements" (BT 191). But
the present-at-hand breaks from this involvement in much the-Same way the
world breaks down for Clov in the passage cited above: "When we merely stare
at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to
understand it" (BT 190). In a conversation with Georges Duthuit, Beckett
commentsorlthe present-at-hand worl d Clov obse rves:
A11 have turned wi sely ta il, before the ulti mate penury, back to the
more wisely where destitute virtuous mothers steal bread for their
starving brats. There is more than a difference of degree between
being short, short of the world, short of self, and being without
these esteemable comodities. (~_r:9~~~ 122)
Beckett's talk of "being short of the world," as it refers to his characters'
loosing grip on the equipment of the world, parallels Heidegger's talk of
anxiety. Heidegger introduces this concept into Bei!lfLand Time by recalling
that Being-in-the-world is a basic state of DaseTn-.-That in the face of
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w_h_i_ch .o!!e __~_s__a_n_x_i~!l'__i~~_~Ln.g_=- i n-_the-wo_!'J~~uc~" (230) . In anxi ety,
equi pment fl ees out of reach. Thi sis part of wha t Clov experiences when
he views his world with the telescope. for in this state-of-mind, Dasein
flees into the inauthentic existence of the 'they':
What is the difference phenomenally between that in the face of which
anxiety is anxious and that in the face of which fear is afraid? That
in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-theworld. Thus it is essentially incapable of having an involvement.
(BT 231)
Here Herdegger's philosophy is tangential to Beckett's fiction. And who writes
of one's lack of involvement with the world more convincingly than Beckett,
whose characters are in a perpetual state of fleeing from Nothing?
Malone Dies is perhaps Beckett's most sustained portrait of anxiety. Here
Beckeffpresents two parallel views of Dasein in anxiety, Dasein forever
falling into inauthentic existence. In the novel, Malone tells the story of
Sapo-t~acmann, an autobiographical story which disintegrates as r~alone himself
disintegrates from anxiety.
Malone initially sees himself as free, as a Being-with-possibility: "This
time I know where I am going, it is no longer the ancient night, the recent
night. Now it is a game, I am going to play. I never knew how to play,
till now" (TN 180). This accords with anxiety which
makes ma-nifest in Dasein its Being towards_ its ownmost potential ityfor-Being--that is, its Bei.i1ll..:!!,~e for the freedom of choosing itself
and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its
~_~i_nJl:"free_f_o_r:. (propensio in_ . . . ) the authenticity of its Being,
and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. (BT 232)
Yet Malone is unable to bare such freedom--acting is too risky--he mightdecide
he should have done something else in the future: "But it was not long before
I found myself alone in the dark. That is why I gave up trying to play and
took myself for ever shapelessness and speechlessness, incurious wondering,
darkness, long stumbling with outstretched arms, hiding" (TN 180). SapoMacmann is born from this paradoxical fleeing into inauthentlcity to ward off
the freedom of authenticity. Malone looses himself in the identity of Sapo,
his created doppelganger through whom he views the authenticity existence
discloses.
The young Sapo is thus capable of experiencing the world as ready-to-hand:
But he loved the flight of the hawk and could distinguish it from all
others. He would stand rapt, gazing at the long pernings, the quivering
poise, the wings lifted for the plummet drop, the wild reascent,
fascinated by such extremes of need, of pride, of patience and
solitude. (TN 191).
The needs of the hawk mirror Sapo's own needs, and provide the courage to
rise out of inauthenticity. r~alone's editorial comment is hence a vain attempt
to justify the inauthenticity to which he has resignedlhimself:
And a little less well endowed with strength and courage he too would
have abandoned and despai red of ever knowing what manner of being he
was, and how he was going to live, and lived vanquished, blindly, in
a mad world, in the midst of strangers. (TN 193)
By telling Sapo's story, Malone hopes to rise outof his own inaction and to
find his individual voice. Sapo's story thus becomes a story of anxiety,
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"for anxiety individualizes . . . . [ and J. . . brings Dasein back from its
falling, (lnd :Ilakes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity
arp possibilities of its Being" (I3T 235). As he writes Sapo's story, Malone
feeh d ctlJrlfJc. a reawakening: "It is because it is no longer I, I must have
said so long ayo, but another whose life is just beginning" (TN 207-08).
This life just beginning is the authentic existence Malone ;s waking to. A
feelin(J characteristic of anxiety, a fleeing "in the face of. It does not
flee in the face of entities within the world; these are precisely what it
flees -towarciS-:":-as- entities alongside which our concern. lost in the 'they,'
can dwe-1T-fn-tranquillized familiarity" (§I 234).
The familiarity which mitigates the uncanniness of anxiety is realized by
Sapo's stay with the Lamberts. The Lamberts are as close as Beckett comes
to depicting home life. And while Sapo dwells with them, he is treated to
all the homey comforts of rural living--a lazy mule, lentil soup, rabbit
killing, and at night, incest. Until the No-thing returns and Sapo becomes
terrified and flees. And the family dissolves into an uncanny chaos:
Yes, an old foetus, that's what I am now, hoar and impotent, mother
is done for, I've rotted her, she'll drop me with the help of
gangrene, perhaps papa is at the party too, I'll land headforemost
mewling in the charnel-house, not that I'll mewl. not worth it. (TN 225)
In HJ?19!:y_gLJ~b_e___C9_n~ept_J>_~~~ Heidegger describes the uncanniness Sapo
experiences while at the Lambert s home:
One no longer feels at home in his most familiar environment, the one
closest to him; but this does not come about in such a way that a
defi ni te regi on in the hitherto known and fami 1i a r worl d breaks
down in its orientation, nor such that one is not at home in the
surroundings in which one now finds himself, but instead in other
surroundings. On the contrary, in dread, being-in-the-world is
totally transformed into a 'not at home' purely and simply. (289)
In this state of anxiety, the words and the things begin to flee from Malone.
He drops his pencil, and he can't rise from his bed to retrieve it. His
stick falls away from him, and his chamber-pot-cum-breakfast-bowl disappears.
Heidegger observes that "the leveling and the disappearance of Dasein in the
Anyone is a f~ll]jTllL~rt_ of Dasein which is covered up by the public and
everyday character of the Anyone" (HT 282). Malone's falling apart is so
complete that he begins to fall out 0-[ Being-in-the-world. That is. he
begins to loose all ready-to-hand entities: "Strange, I don't feel my feet any
more, my feet feel nothing any more, and a mercy it is" (TN 234). Ultimately
language, which for Heidegger is "the House of Being," begins to flee from
Malone's grasp (B_a~i~!1ritiJ:!iLs 122):
But my fingers too write in other latitudes and the air that breathes,
through my pages and turns them without my knowing, when I doze off,
so that the subject falls far from the verb and the object lands
somewhere in the void, is not the air of this second-last abode, and
a mercy it is. (TN 234)
Heidegger expl icates thrs- progression into deep anxiety as a dread of death:
-This experience can, though it does not have too--just as all possibilities
of being come under a 'can'--assume a distinctive sense in death or,
more precisely, in s:I1LQ.9... We then speak of the dread of deat~, ~hich
must be kept altogether distinct from the fear of death, for 1t 1S
not fear in the face of death but dread as a disposition to the naked
being-in-the-world, to pure Dasein. (t~T 291)
Thus Malone dies.
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III

In the dread of death. Malone falls from his V1Slon of authentic existence
as opened by anxiety, and sinks into inauthenticity. Thus Sapo disappears
into the 'they', and looses his individuality. When he returns. he returns
in the guise of an-other, Macmann. In anxiety Sapo surrenders so deeply
into the herd that he becomes hidden from his true self and from his creator.
Malone, whose own individuality dissolves into the story he tells:
But suddenly all begins to rage and roar again, you are lost in
forests of high threshing ferns or whi rled far out on the face of
wind-swept wastes, till you begin to wonder if you have not died
without knowing and gone to hell or been born again into an even
worse place than before. (227)
"

,e
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As Malone-Macmann die, they relinquish themselves to complete inauthenticity:
"I speak of morning and afternoon and of such and such an hour, if you
simply must speak of people you simply must put yourself in their place, it
is not difficult" (TN 270). Their fall is all the more pOignant because
both have experience~the anxiety capable of disclosing authenticity. For
Heidegger, anxiety liberates "from possibilities which 'count for nothing'
[ "nichtigen" J, and lets him become free foJ:. those which are authentic"
(BT 395). Having denied the freedom anxiety offers, Malone-Macmann can
only wait, inauthentically, and ponder the vision of authenticity.
Beckett's characters ultimately choose this death-in-life waiting by default,
since they lack the courage to act. Hence the refrain in Waiting for Goqot:
Estragon: Let's go.
Vladimir: We can't.
Estragon: Why not.
Vladimir: We're waiting for Godot. (10)
In ~einund TLme Heidegger makes clear that "the inauthentic future has the
character of awaiting" (386). In a footnote, Macquarrie and Robinson point
out the subtlties of the German term for awaiting, des Gewartigens: "While
the verb 'await' has many advantages as an approximation to 'gewartigen',
it is a bit too colourless and fail s to bring out the important idea of beJ....Q.9.
~~I~iLt9_rec_~9_n wiJ:~ that which one awaits" (BT 386 n.4). This "being
prepared to reckon with" is precisely what Beckett's characters lack. Like
Vladimir and Estragon, they are too caught up in futile analysis and selfintrospection to commit themselves to the future by acting. Thus they wait,
forever poised between the thought and the act. For Heidegger waiting is
how we comport ourselves toward the possibility of action, an, action
authenticity can take up. But this is what Beckett's characters fail to do.
For them, waiting never ends, and they remain sunk within a plethora of
possible decisions, but impossible choices. Beckett's characters no longer
hope for authenticity, but wait, with no intent to act.
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The Unnamable, more than any other of Beckett's failed characters, waits in
vain for the actualization of action:
And there is nothing for it but to wait for the end, nothing but for
the end to come, and at the end all will be the same, at the end at
last perhaps all the same as before, as all that livelong time when
there was nothing for it but to get to the end, or fly from it. or
wait for it, trembling or not, resigned or not, the nuisance of doing
over, and of being, same thing, for one who could never do, never be.
(I~ 370)
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The Unnamable can never actualize possibility, can never end. He has
resigned himself to inauthenticity and fails to accept the possibility-forfreedom disclosed in anxiety. In the third paragraph of his soliloquy he
equates his Being with the they-self by becoming other characters in Beckett's
fiction: "To tell the truth I believe they are all here, at least from
t·1urphy on, I believe we are all here, but so far I have only seen Malone"
(TN 293). And recall that the only place the Unnamable is, is in his own
thouqht. Thus he next asks: "Is this not rather the place where one finishes
vanishing?" (TN 293). The Heideggerian 'one' takes on great significance
here. The Unnamable vanishes into inauthenticity as one does, when one lacks
the courage to act. For this reason, he no longer has contact with readyto-hand equipment. Heidegger sums up the Unnamable's plight accordingly:
The awaiting of the "towards-which' is neither a considering of
the 'goal' nor an expectation of the impendent finishing of the work
to be produced. It has by no means the character of getting something
thematically into one's grasp. Neither does the retaining of that in
which we let something be involved, than they do to what is involved
i tse 1f. (~J 405 )
Read literally, the Unnamable is a mucilage egg shaped head suspended in
a cage between a Parisian cafe and a butcher shop. But read in light of
Heidegger's discussion of authenticity/inauthenticity, he becomes a man
sitting at an outdoor cafe who realizes he has fallen so far away from his
individuality that he has lost the very 10cation--the Da--of his body.
This is further evidenced by the Unnamab1e's lack of a name. To name is
to individualize, to provide distinct location for. The nameless Unnamable
is a post-modern Everyman-yet-no man. His search for name-location is a design
woven throughout his soliloquy: Mahood, Worm, Jones--a11 rejected names as
the Unnamable falls ever deeper into the'they' where he becomes t~urphy, Watt,
r~olloy, Malone, Mercier-Camier.
Nor is the Unnamable alone in his inability to become authentically involved
in the world. The voice of Beckett's seventh Text for Nothing concludes with
a hope to re-begin a search for authentic identity:
And to search for me elsewhere, where life persists, and me there,
whence all life has withdrawn, except mine, if I'm alive, no, it
would be a loss of time. And personally, I hear it said, personally
I have no more time to lose, and that that will be all for this
enemy, that night is at hand and the time come for me too to begin.
(Stories and Texts for Nothi!:!.9. 110)
How It fs con-cTLideswlth as imil ar, though more bitter 1ament:
-- so- things may change no answer end to answer I may choke no answer the
dark no answer trouble the peace no more no answer the silence no
answer die no answer DIE screams I MAY DIE screams I SHALL DIE screams
good (147) .
Here too" the anxiety which opens possibility is leveled to an unheeded dread
of death, and the character becomes self-doomed to wait for an authentic
existence he realizes, in moments of self-honesty, will never be choosen.
The Unnamab1e says it best:
you must say words, as long as there are any, until they find me,
until they say me, strange pain, st~ange sin, you must go on, perhaps
it's done already, perhaps they have said me already, perhaps they have
carried me to the threshold of my story, before the door that opens_on my
story, that would surprise me, if it opens, it will be I, it will be
the silence, where I am, I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence
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you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on.

(TN 414)

The Unnamable remains on the threshold of authenticity and, representative
of Beckett's characters, would rather tell stories, sink into a never ending
self-analysis, or simply wait by a tree than leap into the possibility of
authenticity. Malone: "And there comes the hour when nothing more can
happen and nobody can come and all is ended but the waiting that knows
itself in vain" (TN 241). Lacking the courage to launch into authentic
existence, all that-remains is this waiting, as one waits, alone with
everyone in the dark. Anxiously analyzing, and failing to open into
authenticity, possibility, Being.
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